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Abstract
We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First,
political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize
the probability of winning an election and the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest
groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences
to the political parties, and they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find
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Introduction

Models of electoral competition typically make extremely strong informational assumptions regarding the political preferences of voters. In Downs-Hotelling spatial
competition models political parties or candidates are generally assumed to have
complete information about the distribution of the ideal policies of the voters when
selecting platforms. Probabilistic voting models relax only somewhat this assumption of complete information on the side of parties by introducing a ‘bias’ term in the
preferences (utility function) of voters, which favors one of the parties independent of
their policy stances. However, parties are supposed to exactly know the probability
distribution of these biases. Another strand of models, focusing on campaign contributions and expenditures, allows for malleable preferences but assumes that parties
know precisely how campaign expenditures aﬀect those preferences.1 Although we
certainly do not want to argue against the use of simplifying assumptions, we think
it is important to also examine models that make more realistic assumptions. For
instance, how do parties actually get their information regarding voter preferences?
Starting point of this paper is the observation that parties do not just know what
makes voters tick but have to find out through some kind of polling. Taking the
two-party spatial competition model as framework, we therefore incorporate polls
as a carrier of information on political preferences. However, polling is a costly
search activity. Parties require resources to do so. For two reasons, voters may be
willing to contribute in the form of eﬀort or money. Firstly, because in this way they
can aﬀect the election outcome (electoral motive). Secondly, by conditioning their
contributions they may aﬀect the policies of parties (influence motive). Conditioning
takes place by making contributions only available for polling on issues that are
salient to the contributing voters. To illustrate the realism of this assumption, we
refer to the U.S. presidential elections. As exemplified by Howard Dean’s campaign,
voters contribute to (new) candidates within parties who are willing to represent
their major concerns. This eﬀectively implies that the amount of polling regarding
policy stances related to these concerns is increased. If the candidate is successful
(s)he will win the race and can implement the policies preferred by the voters who
supported this candidate. Instead of contributing directly to candidates or parties,
voters may choose an indirect way by supporting intermediary institutions with the
same purpose (see, e.g., www.meetup.com). For simplicity, we will not distinguish
between these diﬀerent channels of political influence, but have voters contribute to an
interest group which makes their contributions conditionally available to the parties.
In line with the evidence presented by Ansolobehere et al. (2002), contributions are
not modeled as resulting from an explicit investment calculus, but are assumed to
be primarily driven by dissatisfaction with existing policies on issues of particular
concern to the voter. Furthermore, voters who get politically involved in this way are
likely to identify themselves with the political issues and interest groups they go for
1
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(Akerlof and Kranton (2000)). Our model assumes, therefore, that some coordination
of voting will take place, because of the extra weight that voters will attach to the
policy positions identified with the interest groups. Clearly, this coordination of
voting may in turn aﬀect policies.
By having political parties experiment before an election with diﬀerent policy
positions to improve their chances of winning, our model is most directly related to
the work of Kollman et al. (1992, 1998), who introduced this notion of adaptive
political parties.2 An important motivation for their research was to investigate
the relevance of the theoretical ‘chaos’ results for multi-dimensional issue spaces.
These results suggest that, in general, incumbents would always be defeated by the
challenging party, and that policies would wander all over the issue space (for surveys,
see Coughlin (1990), Mueller (2003)). In contrast, the simulations of Kollman et al.
(1992) showed convergence of the parties’ platforms to the center of the distribution
of voters’ ideal positions. Our paper extends their analysis, and the existing literature
on electoral competition and interest groups, in two directions.
The first direction our analysis takes has the following features: (a) we allow interest groups of voters to develop, where the contributions of the latter determine the
resources an interest group can oﬀer parties; (b) these resources provide endogenous
war-chests to party candidates for campaigning, with polling results determining the
party’s platform; (c) resources for polling provide endogenous opportunities and constraints for the transfer of information between voters and parties. Moreover, interest
groups coordinate the voting behavior of their members through identification.
The second direction explored in this study concerns the impact of endogenously
changing political preferences of voters. Even if voters are fully aware of the platforms
selected by parties, they will often lack the expertise necessary to evaluate the consequences of these platforms for their concerns, and they may not be willing to bear
the costs of finding out. Instead, they may take cues from the positions taken by parties (Jackson (2003)), the endorsements by interest groups (Grossman and Helpman
(1999)), or the political preferences of other voters they meet. In this paper, we will
focus on the last possibility, assuming that preferences are influenced through social
interaction, that is, the distribution of beliefs among the voters interacted with. As a
result, clustering of voters’ ideal policies can occur. Our work on this issue of social
clustering is related to models of herding behavior (Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani
et al. (1993), Kirman (1993)) and, more directly, to the psychological social impact
model of Latane (1981) and the opinion formation model of Corradi and Ianni (1998).
This paper is mainly concerned with the role of interest groups as information
brokers in a spatial competition model, acknowledging that political agents face substantial information problems in reality. In the full model, with endogenous political
preferences, the importance of the interest groups depends on the interaction structure within the electorate and on the election outcomes, while the latter are again
influenced by the sizes and political stances of the interest groups. Among the ques2
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tions that will be addressed are the following: Does the structure provided by interest
groups help stabilize the political process, or do we witness more volatility in the presence of these groups? What are the welfare eﬀects of interest groups performing the
role of information brokers? What are the consequences of political preferences
aﬀected by social interaction? Does social interaction lead to consensus? How do interest groups impact the belief formation process and, thereby, the results of the full
model? Because of the complexity of the theoretical model, simulation methods will
be used to explore the behavioral dynamics and tendencies, and to derive directions
for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic electoral
competition model, where parties have to engage in costly search to find out about
voter preferences. In Section 3, we extend this model with endogenous interest group
formation, to investigate the role and influence of interest groups as information
brokers. Section 4 studies how clustering of political preferences may arise through
social interaction and the electoral consequences thereof. Section 5 investigates the
dynamics of the full model, comprising interest groups as well as political preference
formation, while Section 6 concludes.

2

Electoral competition with information search

Let there be a population of N voters, indexed j = 1, . . . , N and let there be I
issues, indexed i = 1, . . . , I. For issue i there are Ki diﬀerent positions, indexed
k = 1, . . . , Ki . The policy or issue space is X = {1, . . . , K1 } × . . . × {1, . . . , KI }.
Voters are associated with an ideal point x ∈X and their utility with respect to a
certain policy outcome y ∈X is given by the negative of the (weighted) Euclidean
distance between this policy outcome and their ideal point, i.e. utility for voter j of
policy outcome y is given by
uj (y) = −

I
X
i=1

sji (xji − yi )2 ,

(1)

©
ª
where sji ∈ S = s1 , s2 , . . . , sL is nonnegative and corresponds to the weight or
strength that voter j attaches to issue i. Each voter j is therefore identified by a
2I−tuple (xj , sj ) = (xj1 . . . , xjI , sj1 , . . . , sjI ) ∈ X × S I . If a voter can choose between
two diﬀerent political candidates (s)he votes for the candidate which has a platform
that generates the highest utility for him (her).
A configuration of voters is generated as follows. First, for each voter j, an
ideal point (xji )i∈I is generated by independently drawing xji , i = 1, . . . , I, from the
discrete uniform distribution on {1, 2, . . . , Ki }. Subsequently, the strengths for agent
j on issue i (sji ) are independently drawn from a discrete distribution on S.
Given the initial configuration of voters an electoral landscape is constructed as
follows. There are two political parties entering the election, the incumbent and the
4

challenger. In line with Kollman et al. (1992,1998), who were the first to study this
type of computational electoral competition model, we assume that the incumbent
does not change its policy from the previous period. Each voter votes for the political
candidate yielding him the highest utility as given by (1). In case this utility is
the same for both political candidates the voter votes with probability 0.5 for the
challenger and with probability 0.5 for the incumbent. For every position z in the issue
space the height of the electoral landscape can now be determined as the expected
fraction of voters voting for the challenger, if it selects position z. At every position
where the height of the landscape is above 0.5 the challenger is expected to win the
election.
Political parties are assumed to be only interested in getting elected, i.e., they view
policies as a means to winning elections. The objective of the challenger is therefore
to find the positions of the high points of the landscape. This is consistent with a
situation where candidates are only interested in getting elected and therefore search
for the highest position (which will make them harder to beat in the next election if
they win the present one). It is also consistent with a situation where candidates are
interested in maximizing the number of seats in the legislature. The problem of the
challenger therefore reduces to a search problem: it has to find the optimum of some
complicated nonlinear function (i.e. the electoral landscape). We assume that the
challenger applies random search, that is, the challenger randomly selects a number
of positions in the issue space and tests them against the incumbent’s policy using
a poll. Such a poll consists of a randomly drawn subsample of the population of
voters. The challenger observes the fraction of the poll that favors its policy over the
incumbent’s policy and uses this as an estimate for the true height of the landscape
at that position.3 If there are platforms with a polling result of at least 0.5 then the
challenger chooses the position with the highest polling result, otherwise it chooses
the incumbent position. Subsequently, the election takes place and the candidate
that wins will be the incumbent for the next period. This procedure is repeated for
each election that follows.
Let us now discuss some simulations with this basic model. For all simulations
in this paper we use the following specification of the model. We have two issues
(I = 2), with 5 positions per issue (K1 = K2 = 5) and three diﬀerent strengths per
issue, characterizing indiﬀerence, moderate importance and high importance attached
to an issue (S = {0, 0.5, 1}). Furthermore, we consider 20 consecutive elections and
work with a population of N = 301 voters. For each poll 10% of the population is
sampled. The choice to consider only two issues is less restrictive than it might seem.
There is some empirical evidence that politics takes place in a low-dimensional space
3

The fraction of voters in the poll who favor the challenger at a certain position is a reasonable
estimator for the altitude of the electoral landscape at that position. Let the altitude of the electoral
landscape at a certain position be p. Then randomly drawing (without replacement) n voters out
of the population of N voters, the fraction of voters in the poll who favor the challenger has mean
p(1−p)
(see e.g. Ross (1993, p.52)).
p and variance N−n
N−1
n
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Figure 1: Time series of diﬀerent measures, averaged over 100 trials, for the benchmark model. Solid lines correspond to the model with 8 polls, broken lines correspond
to 2 polls. Upper panel: average Euclidean distance between center and election outcome. Middle panel: average Euclidean distance between challenger and incumbent.
Lower panel: frequencies with which the challenger wins an election.
(see e.g. Poole and Rosenthal (1991), who show that at most two dimensions are
necessary to explain the roll call voting behavior of members of Congress in the US).
Figure 1 shows the value of three diﬀerent measures describing the outcomes of
the model averaged over 100 trials. For each trial a new configuration of voters is
drawn. There are 20 elections with either 2 (broken lines) or 8 (solid lines) polls
per election. The first measure (‘convergence’, upper panel in Figure 1) corresponds
to the Euclidean distance between the election outcome (that is, the policy position
of the candidate that wins the election) and the center of the distribution of voter
preferences. In this paper we refer to the center as the policy position that is constructed in the following way. For each issue we consider the distribution of ideal
points in that issue and determine the (uni-dimensional) median voter in that issue.
We then define the center of the whole issue space as that (multi-dimensional) policy
position for which each element corresponds to the uni-dimensional median in the
6

corresponding issue. The upper panel of Figure 1 shows that the distance between
the election outcome and this center position decreases over time towards 0, implying
that in some sense a median-voter result still applies in our model. Furthermore,
more information about the electoral landscape (i.e. an increase in the number of
polls), leads to faster convergence. The second measure (‘separation’, middle panel
of Figure 1) gives the Euclidean distance between the policy positions of the incumbent and the challenger at each election. The simulations show that the separation
between parties’ platforms decreases as elections go by. However, running more polls
generates a higher separation. The reason is that an increase in the number of polls
increases the probability of selecting positions that are close to the incumbent position. For such positions the polling result may be (due to sampling errors) such that
the challenger selects this neighboring position although it would have been better oﬀ
taking the incumbent’s position. This leads to a higher average separation. This also
suggests that the challenger’s probability of winning may be reduced if he runs more
polls. The lower panel of Figure 1, which shows the empirical frequency of election
victories of the challenger, confirms this. Of course, the simple assumption that the
challenger is not restricted in its mobility, like for instance to a region near its previous position (as in Kollman et al. (1992)), is important here. However, we do not
want to investigate more specific assumptions in this respect, because of our interest
in comparative issues, that is, the consequences of introducing interest groups and
social clustering. Summarizing Figure 1, the simulation results for the basic model
replicate the finding of Kollman et al. (1992) that policy platforms tend to converge
to the center of the distribution of voter preferences.

3

Interest groups as information brokers

In the realistic situation modeled in the previous section where political parties have
by themselves little information about the preferences of the voters, there exists a
natural role for interest groups to emerge as information brokers. In fact, by participating in collective action concerning issues that are important to them, voters can
influence the electoral process in three diﬀerent ways. First, by joining in the supply
of resources (monetary contributions or eﬀort) to a political party they can influence
that party’s electoral success, given that polling is costly. Second, coordination creates the opportunity to gain influence through conditioning the polling carried out
with the resources supplied. Third, identification with the interest group is likely to
induce some coordination of voting behavior. By giving extra weight to the issue emphasized by the interest group, political preferences are eﬀectively shaped into some
kind of lexicographic order. Of course, since joining an interest group is assumed to
entail some costly contribution, there is a free-riding problem to be taken care of. In
light of existing empirical evidence, participation will not be modeled as the outcome
of a sophisticated political investment calculus, but rather as a form of consumption
(expression) and emotional gratification linked up with the hope of aﬀecting the po7

litical process in a desired direction (see e.g. Ansolobehere et al. (2002), Marcus and
MacKuen (1993)).4
More formally, interest groups are modeled as follows. For convenience, interest
groups are assumed to be organized around single issues.5 Interest group m is denoted
by (im , k m ), where im ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} is the issue on which group m focuses and
k m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Kim }, is the (unique) position that this group takes on that issue.
For example, the interest group characterizedPby (im , k m ) = (2, 5) takes position 5
on issue 2. Notice that there are potentially Ii=1 Ki diﬀerent interest groups. The
potential members of group m are those voters that have position k m on issue im .
These potential members decide whether to join or not. After this process of interest
group formation is over, it is endogenously determined which interest groups become
‘eﬀective’, that is, which groups have collected enough resources to be able to support
a candidate (assuming a minimal cost of polling).
We now turn to an individual’s decision to join an interest group on a particular issue. Three factors are assumed to determine the benefits from joining: dissatisfaction
with the incumbent’s policy (with disappointment and anger as possible emotional
urges), the importance attached to the issue concerned, and the present size of the interest group. Size is assumed to matter for two reasons. First, the larger the interest
group, the higher the chances of having some influence. Second, the larger the interest group, the stronger the attraction to identify oneself with the group (bandwagon
eﬀect).
On the other hand, there are some costs of joining an interest group. First of all,
joining implies that a contribution c (in money or in kind) has to be paid. Moreover,
as will become clearer below, joining implies some coordination of voting that may
entail a utility loss regarding the issues that are not relevant to this interest group.
More specifically, the interest group formation process is modeled as follows. Voters are drawn in a random order to decide (sequentially) whether to join some interest
groups or not. This procedure is repeated once, implying that each voter has to decide whether to join or not at most two times. Consider voter j, characterized by
(xj , sj ) = (xj1 . . . , xjI , sj1 , . . . , sjI ). There are I potential interest groups the voter
can join, one for each issue. For each relevant interest group m the number vjm ,
representing the benefits from joining, is determined as
µ ig
¶
nm
m
vjm = V
, sjim , |k − yim | ,
(2)
N
where nig
m is the current number of members of interest group m (which of course
depends upon the decisions made by voters that decided prior to voter j) and where
4

See also Camerer (2002) on the lack of sophistication observed in experimental studies of decision
making in complex environments.
5
An extension to multi-issue interest groups is however straightforward. Incidentally, an ideological political party, that is, a party that is concerned with policy outcomes, can in fact be interpreted
as an interest group organized around multiple issues.

8

yim is the incumbent’s position on the interest group’s issue. In line with the factors
discussed above, vjm is assumed to be positively related to: the relative size of the
interest group, the current distance between the voter (and therefore the interest
group) and the incumbent on the issue relevant to this interest group, and the weight
this voter attaches to this issue.6 Since for each interest group he joins the voter
has to pay the contribution c, he ranks the diﬀerent interest groups according to the
values of the associated benefits vjm . If the highest value of these benefits exceeds
the contribution fee c, he joins the corresponding interest group and if it does not, he
joins no interest groups at all. If the first interest group is joined the voter considers
the next interest group in the ranking. If its benefits exceed the contribution fee c
the voter also joins this interest group, and so on.
In our model interest groups influence the election process, on the one hand, by
coordinating the voting behavior of their members and, on the other hand, by the
role they play in the transmission of information about the electoral landscape. We
first discuss the latter. Each interest group possesses certain resources raised by the
contributions of its members. These resources are oﬀered to the challenger on two
conditions: i) resources are used for running polls in policy positions coinciding with
the interest group’s position on the relevant issue; ii) from among the policy positions
tested by the challenger, the platform with the highest poll result is selected (provided
this platform is preﬀered over the incumbent’s position, that is, the estimated height
of the electoral landscape at that position should be higher than or equal to 0.5).
An interesting interpretation of the above procedure is the following. Within the
challenging party, diﬀerent candidates compete for becoming the actual challenger
of the current incumbent. The party itself comes up with some candidates but the
interest groups can also support some candidates. The relative polling successes of the
diﬀerent candidates then decide which candidate becomes the actual challenger (as
in case of a primary). The number of polls to be ran is determined by the resources
oﬀered by the interest groups and the cost of running a poll.7 This endogenously
determines which interest groups become eﬀective, all other interest groups remain
passive and play no further role in the election process.
The voting behavior of the eﬀective interest groups’ members is coordinated as
follows. Once the two political candidates are known each eﬀective interest group
decides which party to support and then all members of the interest group vote for
6

For our simulations the function V is specified as
vjm = sjim (yim

µ
¶
nig
m
− k ) exp 1 +
.
N
m 2

Notice that voters with sjim = 0 never join. Also observe that in order to get an interest group
started at a distance d from the incumbent the contribution c should not exceed d2 exp (1) (recall
that the interest group formation process starts out with nig
m = 0, and that sji ≤ 1). In our
simulations we take c = 1.4 < exp (1), hence allowing interest groups to emerge anywhere (except,
of course, at the incumbent’s position for that issue).
7
In the simulations the cost of running a poll is taken to be equal to 50.
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that party (if a voter is a member of more than one eﬀective interest group that
support diﬀerent candidates, (s)he aligns with the interest group that produced the
highest benefit vjm ). The decision which party to support is taken in the following
way. If exactly one of the candidates takes the interest group’s position on the relevant
issue, the interest group supports that party. If one candidate is closer to the interest
group’s position than the other candidate, the former is supported. If both candidates
have the same position as the interest group, or the distance from the interest group’s
position on the relevant issue is the same, the interest group members vote according
to the utility given by (1).
During an electoral campaign, apart from the platforms supported by interest
groups, the challenger is assumed to run some independent polls on platforms selected
randomly in the issue space.8 It then selects the policy position with the best polling
result from among all the positions with an altitude of at least 0.5. If there are no
such positions then the incumbent’s position is selected. Voters organized in interest
groups vote as discussed above. All other voters vote according to the weighted
Euclidean distance between their ideal points and the diﬀerent policy positions, in
line with (1). The party with the majority of votes wins the election.
Before we study some simulations let us try to develop an intuition for what might
happen. We have a population of voters with separable and symmetric preferences,
uniformly distributed over the issue space and therefore we expect the generalized
median voter to exist. The Generalized Median Voter Theorem (see Hinich and
Munger (1997)) says that, once the median is located, no other platform can defeat
it. It has already been argued in Section 2 that because the probability of choosing
any point in the space (the median in particular) is strictly positive, in the limit the
median is located with probability 1. Due to the finiteness of our issue space this
happens in finite time. Hence, the model predicts that in the long-run the incumbent
converges to the median. Now consider what happens when we introduce interest
groups. Notice that for any voter, membership of interest group m is partly equivalent
with changing the structure of preferences. More explicitly, instead of corresponding
to weighted Euclidean distance, preferences become, in some sense, lexicographic:
weighted Euclidean distance only becomes important when the interest group’s issue
is indecisive. As we will show later (Section 5), an important consequence of this
is that the set of policy platforms defeating the incumbent’s position (the winning
set) is expanded. This is due to the fact that interest groups are more likely to form
far away from the incumbent and hence tilt the electoral landscape at the expense
of the incumbent. This leads to a higher probability for the challenger to win an
election. Furthermore, the probability that the median is located at a given election,
is higher for the model with interest groups as compared to the basic model. If
an interest group emerges at a (uni-dimensional) median position, polls facilitated
by such an interest group have a much higher probability of locating the (multi8

In the simulations, the challenger runs 2 independent polls, each again consisting of a randomly
drawn sample of 10% of the population.
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Figure 2: Time series of diﬀerent measures, averaged over 100 trials, for the interest
group model. Upper panel: average Euclidean distance between center and election
outcome. Middle panel: average Euclidean distance between challenger and incumbent. Lower panel: frequencies with which the challenger wins an election.
dimensional) median (1/Ki versus 1/ (K1 × . . . × KI ) for a regular poll). Thus, if the
location of the incumbent favors the organization of the median voters, the median
is located much faster than in the basic model of Section 2. On the other hand, if
the distribution of voters allows for formation of interest groups asymmetric to the
median the electoral system can move away from the median and cycles in winning
platforms may appear.9 To illustrate this point consider the case where, once the
incumbent is at the median, two groups located on diﬀerent issues and diﬀerent from
the median organize in interest groups. Then the policy position corresponding to
the intersection may, for certain stochastic realizations of voter preferences, defeat
9

Sadiraj et al. (2004a) consider a framework, with two sectors and a government that uses taxes
to redistribute income between sectors, in which this mechanism (which stems from the fact that
interest group formation is advanced by dissatisfaction with the current government policy) is shown
to be able to lead to ambiguous comparative statics results and cyclic behavior in interest group
sizes and government policy.
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Figure 3: Time series of the distance (averaged over 100 trials) between interest
groups’ positions and the incumbent, for the benchmark model (solid lines) and the
interest group model (+).
the center, only due to the fact that interest groups coordinate voting behavior. The
increase in the winning set results in a higher probability that the challenger wins
the election.
Figure 2 shows some distance measures for the simulations we have run. As in
the benchmark model both the distance between parties and the distance between
the policy outcome and the center decrease over time. The most notable diﬀerence
between the basic model and the model with interest groups is that the separation
between party platforms for the latter is significantly higher, with no apparent convergence to the center. Also, the frequency with which the challenger wins the election
shows that the existence of interest groups increases the probability of winning for
the challenger. Summarizing, there are two main consequences of the presence of
interest groups: i) an increase in the number of polls, and ii) an increase in the size
of the winning set. The extra polls that the challenger can run, thanks to the interest groups, help this party to better explore the electoral landscape. This eﬀect,
combined with a larger set of platforms defeating the incumbent, increases the prob12

ability the challenger wins an election. The fact as such that more polls can be run is
not suﬃcient to produce this result, as shown by the simulation results of the basic
model presented in Figure 1. In particular, it seems to be the increase in the winning
set that significantly enhances the probability of winning. Note that, although the
number of polls in the interest group model is variable (2 independent polls and a
variable number of polls financed by interest groups), it is on average equal to 8 per
election, facilitating comparisons with simulations of the benchmark model with 8
independent polls (i.e. the solid lines in Figure 1).
More results concerning the influence of interest groups on policy outcomes are
presented in Figure 3. This figure shows for the basic model and for the model with
interest groups, the distance between the policy outcome for the first issue and the
positions 1, 2 and 3 on that issue, respectively. Clearly, the existence of interest
groups leads to much more volatility in policy outcomes. In the absence of interest
groups, the policy outcome seems to converge to the center of the issue space (the
distance measure converges to 0, 1 and 2, respectively), whereas for the model with
interest groups this is not so clear-cut. This volatility is due to the fact that the
larger interest groups tend to emerge at more extreme positions. As a consequence,
voters at these positions are sometimes better oﬀ, and the convergence to the center
seems to be broken. Note that we obtain these results even though the space is very
small and hence the probability that the system settles at the center is high.

4

Social dynamics

In the previous section we have focused on the interaction between voters and political parties via interest groups as information brokers. In this section we explore
an alternative informational issue, this time concerning the political preferences of
voters and how these may be influenced through interaction between these voters. As
observed by Grossman and Helpman (1999), even though voters may know the policy
positions taken by political candidates, they may not fully comprehend how these
policies would aﬀect them personally. This realistic information problem translates
into uncertainty on the side of voters as to what their ideal point is. One way to deal
with this issue, explored by Grossman and Helpman, is to assume that interest group
leaders have better information which they can signal to group members through
endorsements. We will take a diﬀerent route by investigating an opinion adaptation
model in which the distribution of opinions perceived through interaction with other
voters plays an important role. This interaction may lead to a clustering of opinions
and, in the presence of interest groups, it may influence the interest group formation
process.
Suppose we have created an initial configuration of the population of voters as
described in Section 2. We now model the observation that voters can be influenced
by other voters. Voters are assumed to regularly meet and communicate their political
preferences. In light of these exchanges they reconsider their ideal positions. More
13

particularly, if a voter with a certain position on a particular issue learns that there
are many people having a diﬀerent, but nearby position on this issue (s)he may feel
attracted towards the latter position. We can identify two reasons for this. The first
is that there may be a group externality in the sense that people like to join groups,
for example because this gives them the possibility to identify themselves with such
a group. This group externality might also arise from peer group pressure or social
pressure. The environment voters are living and/or working in may pressure them
into conforming to the reigning political ideas. The second reason why voters might
change to another ideal position stems from the incomplete information argument
presented above. If voters are not completely certain about how to evaluate the
consequences of diﬀerent policy platforms, they may use the sizes of social groups
with similar opinions at nearby positions as information sources (as a kind of poll).
This incomplete information argument seems to be particularly relevant in the case
of competing political parties, where it may be diﬃcult for individual voters to judge
the merits of (the political statements of) these diﬀerent parties.
To model the social interaction we assume the decision function for changing has
the following general form
³ n ´
z
Uj z,
,
N
that is, it depends upon the position z to which the voter considers moving (given
the voter’s current position) and upon the relative size of the social group residing
at that new position. However, voters are not likely to know the exact distribution
of preferences on the issue space. It seems more reasonable to assume that voters
exchange information about their ideal positions when meeting other voters and in
this way obtain an informed guess of the distribution of preferences. We model this as
follows. With some probability ε ∈ [0, 1] , voters reconsider their political preferences
(or political ‘beliefs’). If this happens, voter j aspires to meet λj other voters in order
to get a ‘plausible’ idea of the actual distribution. Because some voters are more
active in meeting other voters than other voters are, we assume that the variable λj
is drawn from the discrete uniform distribution on {0, 1, 2, . . . , dΛN e}. Here dΛN e is
the largest integer smaller than or equal to ΛN , with Λ ∈ (0, 1). For our simulations
1
we will take Λ = 10
. We assume that voters are drawn in random order to meet these
other people. Let i1 , i2 , . . . , iN be the order of these voters, where i1 corresponds to the
first voter that is drawn. This first voter meets λi1 voters randomly drawn from the
population N\ {i1 } and learns their ideal position. In turn, these other voters learn
the respective voter’s position.10 Now the s’th voter meets λ∗is other voters drawn from
the population Ni∗s , where λ∗is = max {λis − #(voters already met by voter s), 0} and
Ni∗s = N \ {voters already met by voter s and is }. Notice that people can meet more
10

An alternative way to model this would be to draw, with replacement, from the population
of N voters, pairs of voters who learn each others ideal point. On the other hand, we could also
assume that the information transmission is unilateral, i.e. only one voter in the pair learns the
ideal position of the other voter. This would resemble information transmission by opinion leaders
generated in, for example, newspaper articles or talkshows on TV.
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Figure 4: The evolution of the distribution of voters’ ideal position over the policy
space, with α = 0.5 and Λ = 0.1. The height of these bars corresponds to the number
of voters at each position in the: initial configuration (top left panel); the 30-th
configuration (top right panel); and the 40-th configuration (bottom panel).
voters than they originally intended to. Therefore, λj actually corresponds to a lower
bound of the number of voters voter j meets. Each voter now has some private
information about the distribution of ideal points. In particular, if we let N j be the
number of people voter j meets and njz the number of people voter j meets that have
j
ideal position z, then Nnzj serves as an estimate for nNz . Each voter uses these estimates
to evaluate the positions in the issue space.
It seems reasonable to construct the above decision function Uj by adjusting the
utility function (1) discussed in Section 2 through a term that models the group
externality. More specifically, for voter j with ideal position x the net benefit from
moving to a position y is described as
µ
¶
µ j¶
njz
nz
Uj z, j = uj (z) + Wj
,
(3)
N
Nj
where Wj (.) > 0 is the group externality function which is assumed to be nondecreasing in its argument. From (3) it is clear that there are two, partially oﬀsetting,
eﬀects from moving to another position. The first is the negative eﬀect of giving up
one’s existing belief of what is the ideal position, the second is the possibly positive
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Figure 5: The evolution of the Herfindhal index over 40 updates for diﬀerent values
of the parameter of the individual sensitivity to group size, α, and the parameter of
information sampling size, Λ.
eﬀect of moving to a position that is shared as an ideal point by more voters.11
This updating of beliefs (ideal positions) is assumed to take place between elections,
prior to the formation of interest groups and the search procedure of the challenger.
Figure 4 gives an example of the distribution of ideal points after respectively 30 and
40 updates (to be interpeted as the number of elections). The height of the bars
corresponds to the number of voters at each position. Remember that the process of
social interaction starts with ideal positions that are uniformly distributed over the
issue space. Clearly, social interaction gives rise to clustering of opinions.
In order to analyze this clustering feature we use the following measure, known
11

In our simulations we use
Wj

µ

njz
Nj

¶

µ
¶
njz
= α ln 1 + j ,
N

where α ≥ 0 measures sensitivity to group size. Modeling the group externality function this way
is consistent with the theory of social impact formulated by Latane (1981). This theory has found
empirical support in a number of sociological studies, such as Latane and Bourgeois (1996). The
estimated value of α in Latane (1981) is 0.46. In our simulations we take α = 0.5.
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as the Herfindhal index of concentration,
C=

1 X 2
n.
N2 z z

(4)

This measure increases as the distribution of the population of voters over diﬀerent
positions becomes more uneven. To get some intuition for this measure notice that,
for the extreme case where all voters cluster into only one position, C equals 1. On
the other hand, if there is no clustering at all and the population of voters is evenly
divided over all possible positions then the number of voters at every single position
N
1
1
and C reduces to K1 ×...×K
(corresponding to 25
= 0.04 in our
would be K1 ×...×K
I
I
simulations), which therefore constitutes a lower bound for the level of clustering.
Finally, to be able to compare the values of C from our simulations to the level of
clustering, suppose that we find a value of this measure equal to C = C0 . This is
equivalent to a situation where all voters are clustered evenly into C10 positions. C
increases as the number of updates increases. For the social configuration after 40
updates, presented at Figure 4, we have C = 0.16, which is approximately equivalent
to all voters being organized evenly into 6 of the 25 positions. More information about
the nature of the clustering process can be extracted from Figure 5. This figure
presents the evolution of the Herfindhal index over 20 elections for diﬀerent values
of α and Λ. From this figure we conclude that i) an increase in the social impact
parameter α leads to higher clustering for a given sample size Λ. Notice, however,
that heterogeneity in opinions survives, since the clustering measure has a maximum
value of around 0.45; ii) the lower the sample size parameter Λ, the longer it takes
for the system to cluster; and iii) for a given value of the social impact parameter
α, there seems to be no monotonic relation between the clustering measure C and
the sample size parameter Λ. One eﬀect of a high value of Λ is that it increases the
predictability of the social dynamics. Given the initial uniform distribution of ideal
points and strengths, if some voters potentially sample almost the whole population
of voters (Λ = 90%) the system will typically cluster at those positions that are most
crowded according to this initial distribution of voters in the issue space. In that
case, clustering will largely depend on the initial representation of positions among
the voters. For low values of Λ, voters are not well informed and their estimates of
the distribution of political preferences may very well be biased. Chance is then an
important determinant of the emergence of new clusters.
Having explained the clustering procedure, we now consider what happens in our
model if we allow for this kind of social dynamics. Let us prohibit the formation of
interest groups for the moment. Convergence to the center, separation between party
platforms and frequency of election victories for the challenger are all shown in Figure
6 for 2 and 8 polls per election, respectively.
From these graphs we see that, for the first couple of elections, when the process
of clustering has not fully matured yet, the policy outcome converges to the center
and the separation between party platforms decreases. These results are similar to
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Figure 6: Time series of diﬀerent measures, averaged over 100 trials, for the social
interaction model. Solid lines correspond to the model with 8 polls, broken lines
correspond to 2 polls. Upper panel: average Euclidean distance between center and
election outcome. Middle panel: average Euclidean distance between challenger and
incumbent. Lower panel: frequencies with which the challenger wins an election.
the ones found with the basic model (compare Figure 1). The social clusters that
have appeared are only moderate in size and hence do not break the symmetry of
the distribution of voter preferences. However, as time goes by clustering increases
and the symmetry of the distribution of voter preferences is broken. As can be seen
from Figure 6 eventually there seems to be a slight increase in the diﬀerent distance
measures. The most notable eﬀect of the social dynamics therefore seems to be that
it prohibits (also in the long run) party platforms to converge to each other or to the
center of the distribution.

5

The full model

Now that we have separately introduced social clustering and interest group formation
in our spatial competition framework, we are ready to study the characteristics of the
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full model. First observe that whereas social clustering is a long run process that
depends only on its own past, the interest group formation process also depends on
the social clustering and election outcomes. The sequence of events of the full model
is as follows:
Step 1. Voters ideal positions and issue weights (strengths) are randomly drawn from
a uniform distribution.
Step 2. Interest groups develop and become eﬀective as in Section 3.
Step 3. The challenger runs polls and selects its policy platform for the upcoming election as described in Section 3.
Step 4. The election is run and the party that wins the election becomes the new incumbent and implements its platform.
Step 5. Social interaction takes place as described in Section 4, leading to a new configuration of voter preferences.
Step 6. The sequence of events restarts at Step 2.
The results of the simulations for the full model are shown, together with the
simulation results for the models from Sections 2, 3 and 4, in Figure 7. The upper left
panel of Figure 7 shows the average distance (over 100 trial runs again) between the
incumbent and the center of the distribution. Clearly, this distance is smallest for the
basic model and highest for the full model. Furthermore, in the early elections (say
the first 5) this diﬀerence can be attributed mainly to the eﬀect of the interest groups.
Later on, however, the social dynamics as well as the existence of the interest groups
seem to be responsible for the diﬀerence. In fact, over time the eﬀect of the interest
groups decreases whereas the eﬀect of the social dynamics increases. The latter eﬀect
ensures that there is no apparent convergence in the full model. The reason should
be clear by now: in the long run the clustering of political preferences really becomes
significant and the appearance of large clusters drives the policy outcome away from
the center of the distribution, which is moving as well.
The upper right panel of Figure 7 shows the average separation between the policy
platforms of the two parties. Clearly, this separation is much larger for the full model
and the model with interest groups than for the basic model and the model with social
clustering. The existence of interest groups therefore seems to play an important role
in explaining the separation between political parties.
Similarly, the probability for the challenger of winning an election is significantly
larger when interest groups are allowed to form, as can be seen from the lower left
panel of Figure 7. There is also a positive eﬀect of social clustering on the winning
probability for the challenger, but this eﬀect is clearly smaller. The probability of
winning is influenced by the existence of interest groups via two channels. First, since
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Figure 7: Time series of diﬀerent measures, averaged over 100 trials, for the four
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challenger and incumbent. Lower left panel: frequencies with which the challenger
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interest groups enable the challenger to run more polls which generate additional
information about the electoral landscape, it is easier for the challenger to find an
element of the winning set. This is a transient eﬀect, however, since it will also speed
up the process of convergence towards the center of the distribution. Second, the
coordination of voting behavior induced by the interest groups changes the electoral
landscape and increases the size of the winning set, given the incumbent’s position.
This is illustrated by the lower right panel of Figure 7 where the average number of
winning points for the challenger is given. The presence of interest groups clearly
leads to a sizable increase in the number of winning points, as has been formally
shown in a similar environment by Sadiraj et al. (2004b) and this is what drives
most of the results found in this simulation study.
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6

Concluding remarks

Kollman et al. (1992) extended the Downs-Hotelling spatial model of electoral competition in an important way by having political parties poll for gaining more information about the preferences of voters, acknowledging the huge informational problems
parties are confronted with in determining optimal platforms. In this paper we have
investigated the consequences of adding two realistic phenomena: i) the formation
of interest groups as information brokers between voters and parties, and ii) social
interaction aﬀecting the political preferences of voters that are typically badly informed as to how their concerns are precisely aﬀected by policies. To model these
phenomena, psychological findings (particularly, dissatisfaction and identification as
motivational forces) were used as explanatory factors.
Our model not only allows for the endogenous formation of interest groups, it also
focuses on a neglected channel of information transmission by such groups, which
concerns the provision of resources to candidates for polling. As a consequence,
our model naturally integrates the two motives distinguished in the literature for
political contributions: the electoral support motive and the influence motive. The
latter motive is integrated through the fact that the provision of resources for polling
is conditioned by the political stance of the interest group.
The simulation results, first of all, corroborate Kollman et al.’s finding of no
‘chaos’. In the basic model there is a clear movement towards the center of the
distribution of voters’ preferences. This changes, however, in the presence of interest
groups. Moreover, we see a divergence of party platforms, even though parties are
oﬃce seeking. This is related to the finding that interest groups enlarge the winning
set, thereby increasing the probability for the challenger to win the election.
We now turn to some social welfare consequences of our model. First, interest
groups as information brokers can be beneficial because winning platforms, if they
exist, are faster selected. This is particularly helpful if political preferences are no
longer fixed, as in case of the model with social clustering. In the longer run the
welfare consequences of the model with interest groups are less favorable, however.
Notice that with voters’ ideal points and issue weights being drawn from a uniform
distribution, convergence to the center would maximize expected (utilitarian) social
welfare. Since convergence is weaker with interest groups, where more volatility is
observed, expected social welfare is negatively aﬀected in that case. On the other
hand, the fact that, with interest groups, voters with ideal points diﬀerent from the
center get sometimes served in terms of policy might be seen as a separate element of
social welfare. A complicating factor in welfare comparisons is that it might be the
case (see e.g. Morton (1993)) that people like winning elections, independent of the
policy outcome.
The framework presented in this paper is seen as a starting point for a more realistic analysis of the interaction between voters and parties. More realistic, in the sense
of taking more seriously the severe information problems these agents are confronted
21

with as well as the strong evidence from psychology and behavioral economics that
individuals are cognitively much less sophisticated (and also more emotional) than
assumed in game theory. As shown in this paper, this also leads to a natural and important role for interest groups as information brokers. For future research we think
it is important to further study this role of interest groups. Another topic deserving
closer scrutiny concerns the belief formation process of voters. Interesting extensions
of our model of social clustering, based on imitation, concern the role of the media
and of (other) opinion leaders. From a theoretical angle it would be interesting, for
example, to establish a more rigorous underpinning of the enlargement of the winning
set that we observed in case of interest groups, which is related to the coordination
of voting that they induce (see Sadiraj et al. (2004b)). How do interest groups as
information brokers aﬀect the ‘chaos’ and ‘cycling’ results that play such a prominent role in the theoretical literature on spatial voting? Finally, predictions derived
from the models might be testable against empirical data, such as the prediction
that greater political volatility will emerge when identification with interest groups
becomes stronger.
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